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Abstract   Resumen 
Much of human cognition is “agent-centered,” subjective, and in that sense 
relative, directed at deciding, “What is best for me”. This is very different 
from “veridical” cognition, directed at finding an objectively correct 
solution inherent in the task and independent of the agent. The frontal lobes 
in particular are central to agent-centered decision making. Yet very little is 
available in the arsenal of cognitive paradigms used in the cognitive 
neuroscience research and in clinical neuropsychology test design to 
examine “agent-centered” decision making. Current paradigms and tests 
used to measure decision making clinically and experimentally are 
veridical in nature and as such miss the essence of “agent-centered” 
cognition. The dearth of “agent-centered” cognitive paradigms severely 
limits our ability to understand fully the function and dysfunction of the 
frontal lobes. The Cognitive Bias Task (CBT) is an agent-centered 
paradigm designed to fill this gap. CBT has been used as a cognitive 
activation task in fMRI, SPECT, and EEG, as well as in studies of normal 
development, addiction, dementia, focal lesions, and schizophrenia. This 
resulted in a range of findings that eluded more traditional “veridical” 
paradigms and are reviewed here. 
  
 La Toma de Decisiones Centrada en el Agente en la Cognición Normal 
y Anormal: Gran parte de la cognición humana está "centrada en el 
agente", es subjetiva, y en ese sentido, está dirigida a decidir: "¿Qué es lo 
mejor para mí?". Esta es una perspectiva muy diferente a la de la cognición 
"verídica", que está más dirigida a encontrar una solución objetivamente 
correcta, inherente a la tarea, e independiente del agente. Los lóbulos 
frontales, en particular, son fundamentales para la toma de decisiones 
"centrada en el agente". Sin embargo, existen pocos paradigmas cognitivos 
en el marco de la neurociencia cognitiva y de la neuropsicología clínica, 
que se hayan diseñado para evaluar la toma de decisiones "centrada en el 
agente". Los paradigmas actuales y las pruebas utilizadas para medir la 
toma de decisiones clínica y experimentalmente son "verídicos" en su 
naturaleza y, por lo mismo, no son adecuados para la evaluación de la 
cognición "centrada en el agente". La escasez de paradigmas "centrados en 
el agente" limita severamente nuestra capacidad de entender plenamente la 
función y la disfunción de los lóbulos frontales. Al respecto, la Tarea de 
Sesgo Cognitivo (o Cognitive Bias Task, CBT) es un paradigma "centrado 
en el agente" diseñado para llenar este vacío. La CBT se ha utilizado como 
una tarea de activación cognitiva en estudios de IRMf, SPECT y EEG, así 
como en estudios del desarrollo normal, adicciones, demencia, lesiones 
focales, y esquizofrenia. Consecuentemente, se han obtenido hallazgos que 
evitan algunas de las limitaciones de los paradigmas más tradiciones, 
"verídicos", y que se revisan en este artículo. 
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1. Introduction  
Neuropsychology has traditionally thrived on 
dichotomies in understanding brain-behavior 
relationships. Distinctions such as declarative 
knowledge and procedural knowledge or episodic and 
semantic memory have been used to help us better 
understand cognition. Here we introduce another 
dichotomy, which is especially critical for capturing the 
distinct role of the prefrontal cortex in cognition. It is 
the distinction between “veridical” and “agent-
centered” cognition. This distinction is often ignored, or 
at least underemphasized in cognitive neuroscience, yet 
it is central to understanding the nature of decision 
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making. 
Decision making presupposes the freedom to 
choose, and any consideration of such freedom must 
eventually address the issue of its brain mechanisms. 
Furthermore, the examination of free choice 
mechanisms will benefit from employing cognitive 
paradigms that require choice-making in 
underdetermined, ambiguous environments, in which 
distinct rational agents may differ in their choices. 
Appreciation of the importance of such decision making 
is reflected in the philosophical literature on imprecise 
probability and decision under uncertainty (ambiguity) 
(Halpern, 2003; Keynes, 1921; Kyburg, 1974; Levi, 
1974). Yet, due to tradition rather than a well reasoned 
research strategy, the paradigms typically deployed in 
cognitive neuroscience are notoriously ill-suited to 
address this issue. Research has traditionally relied on 
fully deterministic paradigms in that a subject is faced 
with a cognitive task characterized by a single correct 
response inherent to the task and independent of the 
agent and with all other responses being incorrect. Even 
in the cutting-edge applications of cognitive 
neuroscience aiming to model complex decision- 
making in environments characterized by a high degree 
of uncertainty (e.g., neuroeconomics, social 
neuroscience) the cognitive paradigms used have 
attached to them an “objective” metric ranking certain 
response selections/decisions as being intrinsically 
“better” than others. While free choice can be exercised 
in fully deterministic situations (which is reflected in 
the fact that rational agents often make bad decisions), 
the best method for fully examining the brain 
mechanisms of “free will,” is to use a cognitive 
paradigm that permits a relatively unconstrained 
selection among a range of choices devoid of a priori, 
intrinsic “quality of choice” ranking. Such a paradigm 
would aim to examine decision making based on 
subjective preference, rather than directed at uncovering 
the intrinsically “correct” solution. Subject preferences 
may be guided by both cognitive decision making as 
well as intrinsic somatic states (i.e., autonomic 
processes) that accompany the situation in which one 
needs to make a choice. These somatic states influence 
decision making and appear to be associated with 
ventro-medial frontal functions (Bechara, Damasio, 
Damasio, 2000). We call such decision making, to 
which a “correct-incorrect” metric does not apply, 
“agent-centered” (as distinct from “veridical”). By 
using such tasks in conjunction with functional 
neuroimaging, neurostimulation, and other state-of-the-
art techniques one may attempt to identify the brain 
networks critically involved in choice selection within 
such unconstrained situations and thus much more 
realistic, situations. 
Real-life cognition is dominated by “agent-
centered” decision making, which ranges from trivial 
(choosing what shirt to wear) to life-shaping (career 
decisions). In either case, the “true-false” metric does 
not apply, since asserting that duck is an intrinsically 
correct choice and steak is an intrinsically false choice 
is an oxymoron, as is the assertion that medical school 
is an intrinsically correct choice and school of 
engineering is an intrinsically false choice. By contrast, 
“veridical” cognition is directed at solving problems 
characterized by intrinsically “true” and intrinsically 
“false” choices, which do not depend on the agent. 
Here, too, the tasks may range from trivial (5 + 5 = ?) to 
complex (what day of the week will be September 15, 
4937?).  
One can argue that in real life the cardinal 
decisions are agent-centered, while veridical cognition 
serves a supportive role, yet the arsenal of cognitive 
paradigms, used both in neuroscience research and as 
the basis for neuropsychological test design, is 
notoriously devoid of appropriate tools to study “agent-
centered” cognition. The traditional focus on veridical 
cognition results in a highly contrived, artificial 
situation, whereby the research and clinical tools 
deployed to understand normal and abnormal cognition 
ignore some of the most fundamental aspects thereof. 
This lamentable circumstance particularly compromises 
and impoverishes our ability to understand the 
contribution of the prefrontal cortex to complex 
cognition, since the prefrontal cortex and related 
structures are particularly central to “agent-centered” 
cognition. Whereas in cognitive neuroscience research 
various innovative paradigms proliferate departing to 
various degrees from the traditional “veridical” 
principle in paradigm design, very little of these 
developments percolated into clinical neuropsychology. 
Even the paradigms most commonly embraced in 
clinical neuropsychology as the “gold standard” of the 
functional assessment of the frontal lobes, e.g. 
Wisconsin Card Sorting Test; Stroop Test, etc, (Lezak, 
Howieson, Loring & Hannay, 2004) are veridical in 
nature and thus remove the aspect of discretionary 
behavior as an essential component of executive 
functioning (Lezak et al., 2004).   
More recently a distinction has been made between 
the "cool” and the "hot" affective aspects of executive 
functions (Hongwanishkul, Happaney & Lee, 2005; 
Zelazo & Cunningham, 2007). The "cool" (without 
reward/penalty) cognitive aspects of executive 
functions, more associated with dorsolateral regions of 
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prefrontal cortex could be measured, for example, by 
WCST and Tower tests. The "hot" affective (with 
reward/penalty) aspects, more associated with ventral 
and medial regions and could be measured, for 
example, by Iowa Gambling Test (Bechara, Damasio & 
Damasio, 1994) and its variants (Kerr & Zelazo, 2004). 
While clearly a major step forward in the development 
of appropriate cognitive paradigms to assess the 
“frontal-lobe” functions, the currently available “hot” 
cognitive tasks still remain veridical rather than agent-
centered, since a presumably objective “true-false” 
metric is commonly attached to them.  
It is thus clear that very little, if anything at all, 
exists in the currently available repertoire of cognitive 
paradigms to assess “agent-centered” cognition. In 
order to correct this situation, a new generation of 
cognitive paradigms must be created, devoid of the 
“true-false” metric and based on subjective preference 
instead. In this paper we will describe such a procedure, 
The Cognitive Bias Test (CBT), and will review its 
applications to several clinical and non-clinical 
populations. CBT is viewed as a prototype for a whole 
generation of future, yet to be designed, non-veridical 
agent-centered paradigms. 
2. Cognitive Bias Task (CBT) 
The Cognitive Bias Task (CBT) is a novel, “agent-
centered” paradigm that examines preferences made in 
a cognitive task devoid of intrinsically correct or 
intrinsically false choice (Goldberg & Podell, 1999; 
Goldberg, Podell, Harner & Riggio, 1994; Goldberg, 
Podell & Lovell, 1994).At the same time, it is 
sufficiently constrained to allow the experimenter to 
quantify the underlying mental processes. The CBT is 
intentionally simple and free of the complex plot layers 
which often characterize other extant paradigms used in 
cognitive neuroscience research in an attempt to 
emulate “real life,” but at the cost of complicating, or 
even obfuscating, any possible interpretation of 
findings. As a result, the CBT represents an 
experimental cognitive paradigm that allows 
examination of free will, or at least “free choice,” in a 
rudimentary and simplified form.  
The CBT is designed to quantify the influence of 
cognitive context on response selection. It examines the 
subjects’ response selection biases, ranging at its 
extremes from highly context-independent and 
inflexible (perseverative) to highly context-dependent 
(field-dependent). These two extremes are expressed as 
extremely low or high CBT scores, respectively. The 
task consists of 60 trials. Within each trial the subject is 
presented a simple geometric form (“target”) and 
subsequently presented two additional geometric forms 
(“choices”) (Fig. 1). The experimental stimuli are 
vertically arranged, with the target (the stand-alone 
shape) on top. 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  Sample Trial from the Cognitive Bias Task (CBT).  In 
this example, choice #1 would yield a score of four as it matches the 
target stimuli along three of the five binary dimensions (color, 
shape, filled).  Choice #2 would yield a score of zero as it does not 
match the target on any of the five dimensions. 
 
The subject is instructed to look at the target and 
then to choose the option that the subject likes the most. 
The instructions clearly indicate that no choice is 
“better” than the other and that the subject is to indicate 
his or her preference. The geometric forms are 
characterized along five binary dimensions (shape, 
color, size, filled/outlined, and one/two items in the 
frame); thus permitting 32 different items meticulously 
counter-balanced in the design across trials. A number 
of constraints are built into the task, which are not 
apparent to the subject. Therefore, the individual’s “free 
choices” are implicitly limited, and thus easily 
quantifiable, though the subject’s impression of “free 
choice” remains. An example of such a constraint is that 
one of the choices is perceptually more similar to the 
target than the other. This feature of CBT permits the 
design of two contrasting veridical tasks that appear 
identical to CBT in every respect except for the 
instruction. Rather than asking the subject to make 
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choices based on subjective preference, the subjects are 
asked to choose based on perceptual similarity or 
perceptual dissimilarity from the target. (For a detailed 
task description see Goldberg et al., 1994). The 
availability of two disambiguated veridical analogues is 
an important feature of CBT design. The “match for 
similarity” and “match for dissimilarity” task 
modifications are natural “subtraction” tasks when the 
CBT is used as a cognitive activation task in functional 
neuroimaging experiments (discussed below). 
Since we designed the CBT a number of years ago, 
it has been used to study normal adult cognition 
(Goldberg et al., 1994; Stratta, Daneluzzo, Bustini, 
Prosperini & Rossi, 2000), cognitive development in 
children(Aihara, Aoyagi, Goldberg & Nakazawa, 
2003), aging (Goldberg et al., 1997), cognitive 
characteristics of addiction (Verdejo-Garcia, Vilar-
Lopez, Perez-Garcia, Podell & Goldberg, 2006), 
cognitive changes in schizophrenia (Stratta, Daneluzzo, 
Bustini, Prosperini & Rossi, 1999), and (most relevant 
to this project) cognitive changes following lateralized 
frontal lesions (Aoyagi, Aihara, Goldberg & Nakazawa, 
2005; Goldberg et al., 1994; Podell, Lovell, 
Zimmerman & Goldberg, 1995).As noted above, the 
CBT has also been successfully used as an activation 
task in fMRI and SPECT studies (Shimoyama et al., 
2004; Vogeley et al., 2003). In fact, as some authors 
have argued that lesion or imaging studies of healthy 
subjects independent of each other are unlikely to 
provide a completely accurate representation of how 
neuroanatomical structures relate to function (Rorden & 
Karnath, 2004). By contrast, a combination of data from 
both sources of evidence are likely to assist in clarifying 
limitations inherent in any one of them. Given that the 
design of the CBT is amenable to both types of studies, 
as demonstrated by the findings discussed here, it may 
serve as a particularly useful task to assist in fully 
understanding the functions of the prefrontal cortex. A 
discussion of these studies is presented in greater detail 
below. 
2.1. Sex differences in normal subjects 
Sex differences in normal cognition have long been 
a major theme in neuropsychological research (Springer 
& Deustch, 2001). As with most of the research in 
neuropsychology, it focused overwhelmingly veridical 
cognition, which has led to potentially inflammatory 
(and not always replicated) claims ascribing 
performance “superiority” on certain cognitive skills to 
one sex over the other. The most common among such 
claims is the controversial and far from clearly 
replicable accretion of female “superiority” in verbal 
cognition and male “superiority” in spatial cognition 
(see Springer & Deustch, 2001).  
By contrast, the CBT allows one to focus on sex 
differences in cognitive styles rather than abilities. A 
wide range of individual differences in selection 
preferences on CBT has been demonstrated among 
normal, or neurologically healthy subjects (Goldberg et 
al, 1994; Stratta et al., 2000). Furthermore, significant 
group differences (e.g. sex differences) have been 
shown among the manner in which healthy, 
neurologically intact subjects exercise “free choice” 
(Fig. 2). Right-handed males make choices in a 
relatively context-dependent fashion (i.e. their choices 
are strongly influenced by the changing perceptual 
context). By contrast, right-handed females are 
relatively context-independent (i.e. their choices are 
guided by stable perceptual preferences unrelated to the 
changing perceptual context). Given the non-veridical 
nature of the CBT, these differences in response 
selection profiles do not reveal the quality of 
performance, but rather capture different response 
selection styles in ambiguous environments. Obviously, 
these findings cannot be over-generalized because of a 
single experimental paradigm and a limited subject 
sample. Our sample consisted of adults. Therefore, it is 
unknown whether differences reported are innate or if 
they arise at particular developmental stages. 
Furthermore, it is unknown if these sex differences in 
cognitive styles persist into the advanced age. 
Additional research is necessary to address these issues. 
Such findings may have interesting ramifications for the 
optimal didactic methods selection for females vs. 
males at various educational levels, for job selection 
counseling and vocational training, and for clinical 
neuropsychological assessment. 
 
 
Figure 2. CBT Score by gender.  A higher CBT score reflects a 
greater degree of context-dependent response style.  A lower CBT 
score reflects a greater degree of context-independent response 
style.  Error bar represents standard deviation. 
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2.2. Handedness differences in healthy subjects  
The relationship between handedness and cognition 
has also been of interest for decades (see Springer & 
Deustch, 2001). As noted above, a considerable 
interaction has been demonstrated between sex, 
handedness, and CBT performance patterns (Goldberg 
et al., 1994) (Fig. 3). This finding is particularly 
intriguing, since most earlier attempts to demonstrate a 
relationship between handedness and cognitive 
variables have not produced robust results. It thus 
appears that the agent-centered paradigm instantiated in 
the CBT may be better suited for characterizing 
cognition in ways, which has eluded more traditional 
veridical paradigms. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.  CBT score by gender and handedness in healthy subjects. 
 
2.3. Functional neuroimaging studies using CBT in 
healthy subjects 
It is tempting to assume on theoretical grounds that 
agent-centered decision making relies particularly on 
the prefrontal cortex. However, how valid is this 
assumption? After all, many of the executive functions 
measured in traditional neuropsychological research 
were at one point assumed to be the exclusive domain 
of the prefrontal cortex, an assertion that has proven 
false (see Lezak et al. 2004 for a review of the 
implication of multiple structures in executive 
functions). Therefore, the empirical test of this 
assumption is best conducted by using the CBT as a 
cognitive activation task in various functional 
neuroimaging modalities. As mentioned earlier, the 
CBT is particularly well suited for functional imaging 
research, because of its natural “subtraction” tasks. It is 
common in functional neuroimaging research to 
administer the critical task in conjunction with a 
baseline or other comparison tasks. The CBT has been 
designed in such a way that on each trial one choice is 
more similar to the target. This permits two 
“subtraction” tasks that retain all the physical 
characteristics of the CBT but are not preference 
“agent-centered” tasks: (a) match for similarity; (b) 
match for difference.  
Patterns of regional cortical activation associated 
with the CBT have been studied with several functional 
neuroimaging modalities. Such studies have 
demonstrated preferential activation of the prefrontal 
cortex when the task was one of subjective preference-
based choice using functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI, Vogeley et al. 2003), single photon 
emission computerized tomography (SPECT, 
Shimoyama et al., 2004), and electroencephalography 
(Kamiya et al., 2002).  
2.4. Cognitive characteristics of addiction 
What distinguishes the cognitive profile of an 
addict from that of healthy individuals? Likewise, are 
there cognitive risk factors predisposing one to 
addiction or cognitive consequences of long-term 
addiction? These questions are of great public health 
importance, and a large body of research exists 
investigating these questions. One assumption often 
made is that executive functions must be particularly 
compromised in addiction. This is a reasonable 
assumption, but as already noted, “executive functions” 
is a rather generic term that subsumes a number of 
loosely interrelated constructs (and neural structures), 
the unifying theme being that they all are somehow 
mediated by the frontal lobes. So how are executive 
functions compromised in addiction?  
To address this question, Antonio Verdejo-Garcia 
et al. (2006) compared the performances on 
neuropsychological tests of heroin addicts to that of 
demographically matched healthy controls. The authors 
were particularly interested in the subjects’ 
performances on the CBT and the Iowa Gambling Test 
(IGT), which is essentially veridical (i.e. characterized 
by intrinsically “good” and “bad” choices), but more 
closely mimics real-life decision making than 
traditional executive tasks. Indeed, the heroin addicts 
adopted suboptimal performance strategies on IGT. 
However, the CBT performance difference between the 
heroin addicts and healthy controls was a particularly 
striking outcome of the study. By contrast, there was no 
difference between the two groups on the 
disambiguated, veridical versions of CBT. These 
findings imply that agent-centered decision making is 
particularly impaired in addiction. 
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2.5. Cognitive characteristics of Alzheimer’s type 
dementia  
Efforts to characterize the cognitive impairment of 
Alzheimer’s type dementia (DAT) have traditionally 
focused on memory impairment. This emphasis is also 
reflected in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
(DSM-IV-TR, American Psychiatric Association, 2000) 
commonly used in the United States for the clinical 
diagnosis of mental health disorders. According to the 
DSM-IV, a diagnosis of any dementia specifically 
requires the presence of memory impairment, 
accompanied by an impairment in one of several other 
cognitive domains (the unfortunate consequences of this 
narrow formulation is, of course, that its mechanical 
application would disqualify other dementia syndromes 
such as fronto-temporal and Lewy body dementias). 
The emphasis on memory impairment in dementias has 
been a mixed blessing, because this focus has diverted 
research regarding impairments in other cognitive 
domains in dementias. It is now increasingly recognized 
that the executive functions are also extremely 
vulnerable in dementias.  
Goldberg et al. (1997) compared CBT performance 
in patients with very early, or mild DAT, advanced or 
moderate DAT, and healthy age-matched controls. 
Changes in performance were evident even among 
those with mild DAT when compared with healthy 
controls. By contrast, changes in the veridical CBT 
version became apparent only in the more advanced or 
moderate DAT group. This finding suggests that the 
prefrontal cortex may be particularly vulnerable at even 
early stages of Alzheimer’s type dementia; a finding 
that was not apparent with the use of traditional 
executive measures that were less sensitive to frontal-
lobe function. 
2.6. Lateralization and sex differences of frontal lobe 
functions: lesion studies 
Hemispheric specialization has been among the 
central themes of neuropsychology (Springer & 
Deustch, 2001), but the frontal lobes have been on the 
periphery of this inquiry, likely because the frontal 
lobes were long thought of as the “silent lobes” of the 
brain (see Luria, 1962 for a historic review of our 
understanding of frontal functioning). Because the 
theoretical framework guiding research on hemispheric 
specialization has long been of verbal vs. visuo-spatial 
distinction, the focus has understandably been on 
primarily posterior cortical structures, notably on the 
temporal lobes (Springer & Deustch, 2001). Thus, 
functional lateralization in the prefrontal cortex was 
considered only as an afterthought. If functional 
lateralization in the prefrontal cortex was considered at 
all, it was merely as an extension of the verbal vs. 
visuo-spatial dichotomy: the left prefrontal cortex as the 
medium of verbal generativity and the right prefrontal 
cortex as the medium of visuo-spatial generativity (see 
Lezak et al., 2004).   
This historic lack of interest in the functional 
lateralization in the prefrontal cortex is contrary to a 
number of morphological, cytoarchitectonic, and 
biochemical findings. For instance, “Yakovlevian 
torque” (a term coined by Robert Bilder to refer to the 
neuroanatomical asymmetry originally described by 
Paul Yakovlev) implies a wider right than left frontal 
pole (Lemay, 1976; Schiff, Saver, Greenberg & 
Freeman,1986; Toga & Thompson, 2003; Weinberger, 
Luchins, Morihisa & Wyatt, 1982); von Economo cell 
(also known as the spindle cells) are more prolific in the 
right than left prefrontal cortex (Allman et al., 2010); 
dopamine pathways are more prolific in the left than 
right frontal regions (Denenberg 1981; Glick, Meibach, 
Cox & Maayani,1979; Glick, Ross & Hough,1982; 
Oke, Keller, Mefford & Adams, 1978; Oke, Lewis & 
Adams,1980; Pearlson & Robinson, 1981; Robinson, 
1979; Slopsema, Van der Gugten & De Bruin, 1982). 
Furthermore, some of these asymmetries are found 
across a wide range of mammalian species. If we are to 
believe there is a relationship between 
structure/biochemistry and function, there are two 
logical conclusions (a) robust functional differences 
must exist between the left and right frontal lobes; and 
(b) at least some of these functional differences are 
irreducible to the verbal vs. visuo-spatial dichotomy, as 
it would represent a uniquely human characteristic.  
The reason these difference have been largely 
overlooked may be that commonly used veridical 
paradigms are not sensitive enough to, or perhaps are 
not altogether appropriate for eliciting, the functional 
lateralization in the prefrontal cortex.  
Goldberg et al. (1994) studied the effects of 
lateralized prefrontal lesions on CBT performance and 
found robust hemispheric and gender differences in 
patients with lateralized focal frontal lesions (Table 1 
and Fig. 4). 
Table 1.  
CBT mean (standard deviation) scores by gender and 
location. 
 
 LF LP HC RP RF 
Males 13 (4.2) 19.3 (5.1) 35.9 (21.8) 36.4 (26.5) 62.3 (4.2) 
Females 54.4(17.8) 12 (12.0) 14.6 (12.4) 7.2 (7.2)  64.8 (2.1) 
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Figure 4.  CBT score in right-handed male and female quadrant 
lesions.  LF= left frontal (males=5; females=5); LP = left posterior 
(males=3; females=1); HC = healthy control (males=21; 
females=14); RP = right posterior (males=5; females=4); RF = right 
frontal (males=8; females=4). 
 
In males, the lesion effects are highly asymmetric: 
left prefrontal lesions produced extremely context-
independent (field- dependent) response selection, and 
right prefrontal lesions produced extremely context-
dependent (perseverative) response selection relative to 
healthy controls.  This sex difference in the degree of 
lateralization of frontal-lobe functions is broadly 
consistent with the neuroanatomical findings of a less 
articulated Yakovlevian torque in females than in 
males. 
CBT appears to be more sensitive to direct frontal-
lobe damage (as in stroke or neoplasms) and in more 
neuroanatomically specific ways, than any of the more 
commonly used cognitive paradigms. This becomes 
evident when CBT’s ability to separate the effects of 
left vs. right prefrontal lesions is compared to that of the 
Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST), which has been 
traditionally considered the “gold standard” of assessing 
frontal-lobe function and dysfunction (Lezak et al., 
2004; Podell et al., 2004). CBT shows a clear 
separation of left vs. right prefrontal lesions (Fig. 5a); 
whereas the WCST fails to do so (Figs. 5b,c)  
 
 
 
Figure 5a.  Individual CBT scores in male left and right frontal 
lesion subjects compared to healthy control (HC) mean score.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 5b. Wisconsin Card Sorting Test Categories Completed in 
male left and right frontal lesion subjects compared to healthy 
control (HC) median score.  
 
 
 
Figure 5c. Wisconsin Card Sorting Test Perseverative Responses in 
male left and right frontal lesion subjects compared to healthy 
control (HC) median score. 
 
Another intriguing finding was obtained in a small 
sample of naturally left-handed patients with lateralized 
lesions (Goldberg et al., 1994). The effects of lesions in 
this cohort were distinct from, and in some way 
opposite to, those documented in the naturally right-
handed patients (Figs 6a & 6b). While this finding is in 
need of replication due to very small left-handed sample 
size, if replicated, it may well be the first demonstration 
of a double-dissociation between handedness and 
performance on a cognitive variable. 
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Figure 6a. CBT scores in right-handed and non-right handed males 
subjects. LF = left frontal (n=2); LP= left posterior (n=3); HC = 
healthy control (n=19); RP= right posterior (n=0); RF= right frontal 
(n=2). 
 
 
 
Figure 6b. CBT scores in right-handed and non-right handed 
females subjects. LF = left frontal (n=0); LP= left posterior (n=2); 
HC = healthy control (n=19); RP= right posterior (n=2); RF= right 
frontal (n=3). 
 
Using the CBT in patients with lateralized frontal 
lesions, it was possible to show that the left and right 
frontal systems play different, and in males 
synergistically opposite, roles in response selection in 
ambiguous environments. These studies were among 
the first to examine the neural basis of choice-making in 
under-determined, ambiguous, “agent-centered” 
situations. These findings are of great potential practical 
importance in the design of cognitive remediation 
procedures individualized according to lesion side (e.g. 
in the anterior cerebral artery strokes), sex, and 
handedness in addition to the already discussed 
theoretical value. 
Inquiry into the role of the prefrontal cortex and its 
different subdivisions in mediating choice-making in 
under-constrained environments is of great potential 
relevance to diverse areas, ranging from clinical 
neuroscience to education to neuroeconomics. Prior 
research, has demonstrated that the frontal lobes are 
central to most complex, “meta-cognitive” levels of our 
mental life and are particularly important in decision 
making in novel situations characterized by high levels 
of uncertainty. Although there is extensive literature on 
the roles of the prefrontal cortex in meta-cognition and 
decision making, it is conspicuously remiss in one 
particular regard: differential contributions of the left 
vs. right frontal lobes to these processes. With the 
contribution of the discussed CBT findings we may 
finally be approaching an understanding of the 
lateralized functional differences in the frontal lobe.  
However, it is still necessary for future research to 
determine how these lateralized differences manifest in 
decision making, and what the optimal integration of 
the left and right prefrontal contribution to decision 
making is.  
2.7. Lateralization of frontal lobe functions: functional 
neuroimaging studies 
Inferring the principles of normal brain functions 
from brain pathology has been extremely productive 
over the years. Nonetheless, this approach has all the 
pitfalls of being indirect. It is necessary to examine 
further the complementary hemispheric contributions to 
"free choice" in healthy individuals using the 
combination of state-of-the-art functional neuroimaging 
and brain stimulation with techniques such as 
Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS). CBT’s 
sensitivity makes it uniquely suited to study the 
functional lateralization of the frontal lobes in normal 
subjects using functional neuroimaging, TMS and other 
neurophysiologic and electrophysiological techniques. 
Shimoyama et al. (2004) used a modified version of 
CBT (mCBT) as a cognitive activation task during 
SPECT in a sample of young adult males. Bilateral 
dorsolateral prefrontal activation was evident. 
Additionally, left inferior prefrontal activation was 
associated with a context-dependent response selection 
strategy. This is broadly consistent with the lesion 
studies discussed earlier.  
2.8. Neurodevelopmental studies 
Is the frontal-lobe functional lateralization pattern 
described in the previous sections fundamental, or is it 
an emergent consequence of something else, as 
observed with language acquisition? Aoyagi et al. 
(2005) addressed the issue by administering a modified 
version of CBT (mCBT) to children with left and right 
frontal focal lesions or epileptic foci, and to matched 
healthy controls. The effects of lateralized frontal 
lesions in children were similar to those described in 
adults. Thus the authors concluded that the functional 
lateralization properties in the frontal lobes captured by 
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CBT appear to be “fundamental” and “biological” in 
nature rather than acquired. 
This does not necessarily imply that the choice 
behavior in underconstrained, “agent-centered” 
situations remains unchanged with age. There is 
evidence that the right cerebral hemisphere matures 
earlier than left, and this may affect the way decisions 
are made at different neurodevelopmental stages. 
Aihara et al. (2003) studied response selection patterns 
on mCBT in different male age groups. A gradual shift 
was evident from predominantly context-independent 
choice selection (5-7 years old boys) to intermediate 
choice selection (7-9 years old boys) to predominantly 
context-dependent choice selection (13-16 years old 
boys). This is consistent with a change in the balance of 
the two prefrontal systems in decision making with age. 
2.9. Lateralization of frontal-lobe dysfunction in 
schizophrenia 
Schizophrenia is being increasingly viewed as a 
syndrome, with many possible causes, rather than a 
single cohesive disorder, which makes any 
neuroanatomical generalization about schizophrenia 
potentially spurious. Nonetheless, frontal-lobe 
dysfunction has been reported as a relatively consistent 
finding across a large body of research. In particular, 
left prefrontal dysfunction has frequently been 
documented (Wolf, Hose, Frasch, Walter & Vasic, 
2008). Stratta et al. (1999) administered the CBT to 
patients with schizophrenia and found a preponderance 
of context-independent reasoning in both female and 
male patients compared to healthy controls. This is 
consistent with the lesion studies described earlier in 
this paper, which linked extreme context-independent 
cognition to left prefrontal lesions.  
3. Conclusions and future directions 
Understanding the mechanisms of adaptive and 
maladaptive decision making has become one of the 
central themes of neuropsychology and cognitive 
neuroscience. Considerable strides have been made in 
the design of cognitive paradigms aimed at studying 
these processes in a more realistic context of (usually 
economic) gains or losses. Yet one broad domain of 
decision making remains largely ignored, despite its 
centrality to human cognition. This is the domain of 
agent-centered decision making, which is preference-
based and to which no objective “good-bad” metric 
applies. In order to understand more completely the 
brain mechanisms of normal and abnormal decision 
making, we need a wide range of agent-centered 
cognitive paradigm. The work reviewed in this paper 
barely “breaks the ice” in this direction, but it is a start. 
Even with a single, limited paradigm represented by 
The Cognitive Bias Task, a number of important 
findings could be made, which eluded previously used 
veridical paradigms. These include the functional 
lateralization of the frontal lobes, sex differences in the 
functional lateralization of the frontal lobes, and others.  
It is our hope that the work described in this paper 
will stimulate the development of an entirely new 
family of cognitive probes designed to assess agent-
centered cognition both as cognitive neuroscience 
research tools and as the basis for clinical 
neuropsychological test design. While The Cognitive 
Bias Task instantiates the “agent-centered” decision 
making construct in a rather distilled, simple form, the 
future instantiation of this construct in test design may 
strive to be more ecologically realistic and to model a 
range of ecologically plausible decision-making 
scenarios. Another direction of future research may 
address the role of affective modulation in agent-
centered decision making. Because of its intrinsically 
personal, subjective nature, agent-centered decision 
making is likely to be more subject to such modulation 
than veridical decision making. Agent-centered 
paradigms may prove to be particularly revealing in 
understanding the role of emotions in decision making 
in the broadest sense. 
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